George Carver's defense of James J. Angleton guised as a review of Tom Mangold's "Cold Warrior," Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene, Vol. 10, No. 5, 1991.

This is worse than an unbalanced defense of Angleton and the havoc he wrought within the CIA. It is dishonest. It makes clear that Carver himself was an Angletonian, not only in personal support but in adhering to the same devastating beliefs and ppolicies. There is no mention, for example, of Angleton's damage to US intelligence. Carver supports Angleton's tragic and paranoid mistakes, like allowing himself to be dominated by the obviously sick-in-the head Golitsyn. He seeks to cover these flaws in his conclusion, where he says that Algleton had his failings and faults and was overly influenced by Golitsyn but this does not cover Carver's flaws, biases and dishonesties, and all that preceeds it is written without regard to the consequences of Golitsyn's insanity and its domination of Angleton and what he did and did not do as head of Counterintelligence.

Another major failing and a serious dishonesty is Carver's misrepresentation in his last sentence, that Mangold's sources "broke their oaths of secrecy." Had this been true they'd have been prosecuted. The book is an obvious defense of the CIA made possible by the CIA, which used Mangold to blame all its many errors on Angleton personally.

Basically and knowingly dishonest is Carver's statement (7) that "Nosenko (about whom he says nothing good and only evil, omitting all reference to what the CIA learned through him) was handled by the CIA's Soviet Division in a manner approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Department of Justice." John Lemon Hart's testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, official CIA testimony, is that what was done to Nosenko over a three-years period was not approved by anyone and was inhuman beyond belief. He omits also that Angleton dominated the CIA's Soviet Division and that some of its people were also forced into retirement and became sources for the Angleton/Carver view of Nosenko.

Mangold' book is excellent in its exposure of Angleton et al and the harm done to US intelligence under Golitsyn's domination but as Carver, of course, does not mention, obvious as it is, Mangold also exculpates the CIA for all its errors, some extraordinarily significant, even dangerous, and heaps them on ~~all~~ Angleton only, thus exculpating the CIA.

I think Carver is wrong (but I'm not sure) in saying that Nosenko claimed to have had the KGB's Oswald file in his possesion twice. My recollection is that he said that after Oswald was identified in 1963 this file, in Minsk, was flown to Moscow where Nosenko read it in haste and turned it over for bucking upward within the KGB.

Carver is so dishonest he refers to the incredible abuses of Nosenko as "arguably excessive." When this treatment, as described officially by the CIA to the HSCA, no detial in Carver's "review," ranged from driving Nosenko crazy to flying him over the ocean and dropping him into it, "arguably" is hardly the word!

11/16/91